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THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR
COOPERATION: A NEW FRONTIER IN NORTH
AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS
by Leonard Bierman*
and Rafael Gely**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the debate leading to the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),' a great deal of concern focused on the
effect that a trade agreement such as the NAFTA might have on workers'
rights.2 As a condition for the ratification of the NAFTA, Congress pro-
vided that the treaty would not "enter into force until the three countries
enact their own national agreement on labor cooperation."3 In response to
this concern, the three signatory countries negotiated the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC" or "Labor Agreement"). 4
The NAALC establishes a formal and elaborate procedure to settle com-
plaints concerning workers' rights. Although the NAFTA itself has re-
ceived considerable attention in the popular press, 5 and in academic cir-
cles,6 the NAALC has been relatively ignored. Whether this lack of at-
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University.
** Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The
authors thank The Center for the Study of Western Hemispheric Trade for its generous support of this
research.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 1.L.M. 296, 605 [hereinafter
NAFFA].
2. See generally Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and Labor Issues: Accom-
plishments and Challenges, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 449-94 (1993).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, §
1010(b)(2), 107 Stat. 2128 (1993).
4. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 8, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
5. See Bob Davis, One America?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at RI; see also Bob Davis,
Going South, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at RI.
6. See Leonard Bierman et al., The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Market Analysis,
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tention is just an oversight, or is due to the belief that the NAALC is
substantively meaningless, is not clear. What is clear, however, is that
labor organizations appear ready to utilize the procedures available under
the Labor Agreement. This Article presents an overview of, and examines
some key issues raised, but not clearly resolved, under the NAALC. This
discussion is developed within the context of four complaints filed and
recently decided pursuant t o the Labor Agreement. 7
II. THE NAFTA AND THE NAALC
A. Overview
Among the many concerns that were raised during the heated debate
leading to the enactment and ratification of the NAFTA were concerns
about the effects that the trade agreement might have on employment in
the United States.8 Leading the debate against the NAFTA and express-
ing concerns over workers' rights, were U.S. labor unions.9 Among the
main concerns raised by the U.S. labor movement were: the possibility
that the mutual elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers would lead to
surges in imports from Mexico and the loss of jobs in the United States;
that U.S. workers might become dislocated as a result of the agreement;
and finally, that labor standards and labor rights in Mexico were weak or
poorly enforced, therefore keeping labor costs in Mexico artificially
low.' o Thus, the ratification of the NAFTA was in great part dependent
on the ability of the U.S. government to address these labor concerns
properly." In addressing these issues, the NAFTA states in its preamble:
"The governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States resolved
to: .. create new employment opportunities and improve working condi-
tions and living standards in their respective territories; . . . [and] to pro-
27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719 (1994); William Cunningham & Segundo Mercado-Llorens, The
North American Free Trade Agreement: The Sale of U.S. Industry to the Lowest Bidder, 10 HOFSTRA
LAB. LJ. 413-48 (1993); McCaffrey, supra note 2; William E. Spriggs & James Stanford,
Economists' Analysis of the Likely Employment and Wage Effects of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J., 495-536 (1994).
7. See infra notes 120-232 and accompanying text.
8. See McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 461-65 (discussing the debate leading to the passage of
NAFA and in particular the concerns raised by the U.S. labor sector); see also Katherine Hagen,
Fundamentals of Labor Issues and NAFTA, 27 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 917-20 (1994).
9. See McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 461-65.
10. Id.
11. See Gerald F. Seib, Clinton Needs to Sway the Public on NAFTA Issues as Poll Shows that
Many Oppose the Agreement, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1993, at A24 (discussing President Clinton's
campaign to win NAFTA's approval in Congress); see also Hagen, supra note 8, at 918-19.
534 [Vol. 10:533
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tect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights .... ,,2
The ability of any mechanism to address effectively the concerns
raised by the U.S. labor movement during the NAFTA ratification debate
is, however, limited by the nature of the NAFTA itself. 3 In particular,
the NAFTA is a free trade agreement, not a treaty of association.1 4 In-
deed, overly restrictive social and legal provisions might defeat the free
trade purpose of the Agreement. 5 Moreover, in negotiating the NAFTA,
the three signatory countries expressed concerns regarding proper mainte-
nance of national sovereignties. 6 The U.S. government was opposed to
the delegation of powers over labor issues to an international labor com-
mission.1 7  The Mexican government indicated that the trilateral
agreement could not in any way intervene with Mexican domestic labor
policy.
8
To address concerns raised about labor matters without interfering
with the overall negotiation of the Agreement, both the Bush and Clinton
administrations followed a two pronged approach with respect to the
NAFTA. First, to address concerns over labor and environmental issues, a
parallel negotiating track was utilized. 9 Side agreements on labor and
other issues were thus negotiated simultaneously with the negotiation of
the NAFTA. Second, in addressing the concerns over national sovereign-
ty, the Labor Agreement was designed within a framework of trilateral
cooperation.20 Under the NAALC, each of the signatory countries simply
pledges to enforce its own domestic labor laws.2' The overseeing mecha-
nism established to enforce this commitment relies on a policy of collabo-
ration, cooperation, and information exchange.
This commitment to a policy of "cooperation" and its use as an
enforcement mechanism establishes the background against which the
procedures established under the NAALC must be judged. It is a rather
unique approach in that it does not involve a supra-national authority or
12. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at pmbl.
13. See Elizabeth C. Crandall, Will NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
Improve Enforcement of Mexican Labor Laws?, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 165, 169-72 (1994).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 471-73.
18. See Crandall, supra note 13, at 170-72.
19. See McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 471-89.
20. Id.; see generally Remarks of Betty Southard Murphy On NAFTA's Labor Cooperation
Agreement: What It Is and How It Works, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 55, at d26 (Mar. 23, 1994)
(discussing the NAALC's operation).
21. NAALC, supra note 4, at pmbl.
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international commission with legal powers. Instead, enforcement of the
NAALC relies primarily on a spirit of information sharing, multi-lateral
cooperation, and public awareness.
B. The Objectives of the NAALC
The preamble to the NAALC states the desire of the three signatory
countries to promote "in accordance with their respective laws, high-skill,
high-productivity economic development in North America by: ... en-
couraging employers in each country to comply with labor laws and to
work in maintaining a progressive, fair, safe and healthy working environ-
ment.''22 This commitment to a high-skill, high-productivity environment
is a direct response to concerns that the NAFTA could result in a lower-
ing of living standards in North America as a result of competition with
Mexico.
The commitment to this high-skill and high-productivity environment
is reflected in the objectives of the NAALC. The three countries agree to
"promote, to the maximum extent possible," principles such as "the right
of workers exercised freely and without impediment to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing to further and defend their inter-
ests: ... the protection of the right of organized workers to freely engage
in collective bargaining on matters concerning the terms and conditions of
employment; ... the protection of the right of workers to strike in order
to defend their collective interests," and several other principles concern-
ing individual employment rights.23
C. Obligations under the NAALC
To accomplish the objective stated in Article 1, the NAALC imposes
a number of obligations on the parties. These obligations are particularly
interesting because of their focus on procedural requirements. In Article
3, each party to the NAALC agrees to "promote compliance with and
effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate government ac-
tion., 24 "Appropriate government action" includes the appointment and
training of inspectors, the investigation of suspected violations through
on-site inspections, the requirement of record keeping and reporting, and
the initiation "in a timely manner" of proceedings to seek appropriate
22. Id.
23. Id. at Annex 1.
24. Id. at art. 3.
[Vol. 10:533
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sanctions or remedies for violations of labor laws.' In addition, under
Article 3 each country is required to ensure that "due consideration" is
given to any request for an investigation of an alleged violation of that
country's labor laws. 26 Article 4, in turn, requires that "appropriate" ac-
cess to administrative, quasi-judicial or labor tribunals is ensured to per-
sons with a legally recognized interest under the country's law.27
The next three articles, Articles 5 through 7, impose on the parties
certain procedural requirements. Under Article 5 each party agrees to
ensure that enforcement proceedings of labor law matters are "fair, equita-
ble and transparent."2 This obligation is to be accomplished through the
provision of certain procedural guarantees including due process,29 pub-
lic proceedings, 30  and the right to present information or evidence.3'
Articles 6 and 7 provide for the publication and dissemination of informa-
tion related to labor law matters in order to promote public awareness of
the country's labor laws and its enforcement and compliance proce-
dures.32
D. "Enforcing" Structures under the NAALC
1. Overview
Part Three of the Labor Agreement creates a Commission on Labor
25. Id. The inclusion of requirements for the appointment and training of inspectors and the
timely initiation of proceedings might prove to be a thorny issue for the United States. For example,
an often heard complaint about health and safety laws relates to the unavailability of inspectors. Simi-
larly, labor unions have strongly objected to the "undue" delays that commonly occur in the enforce-
ment of our domestic labor laws. See generally Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations, Fact Finding Report, May 1994, at 121-23.
26. NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 3.
27. Id. at art. 4.
28. Id. at art. 5.
29. Id. at art. 5(l)(a).
30. Id. at art. 5(l)(b).
31. Id. at art. 5(l)(c).
32. Article 6 provides:
(1) Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings
of general application respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly pub-
lished or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and
Parties to become acquainted with them. (2) When so established by its law, each Party
shall: (a) publish in advance any such measure that it proposes to adopt; and (b) provide in-
terested persons a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.
Id. at art. 6. Article 7 provides: "Each Party shall promote awareness of its labor law, including by:
(a) ensuring that public information is available related to its labor law and enforcement and compli-
ance procedures; and (b) promoting public education regarding its labor law." Id. at art. 7.
1995]
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Cooperation and three National Administrative Offices.33 These bodies
are in charge of "enforcing" the terms of the Labor Agreement. Heavy
emphasis is placed on the principles of cooperation and consultation.
2. The Commission for Labor Cooperation
The Commission for Labor Cooperation consists of a Ministerial
Council34 and a Secretariat. 35 The Council, which is comprised of top,
cabinet-level labor officials, will serve as the governing body of the Com-
mission for Labor Cooperation.36 The Council's duties include oversee-
ing the implementation of the Labor Agreement, developing recommenda-
tions for the further elaboration of the NAALC,37 and establishing priori-
ties for cooperative action.38 The NAALC's mandate to work coopera-
tively covers a broad set of labor issues including occupational health and
safety, child labor, benefits for workers, minimum wages, industrial rela-
tions, the formation and operation of labor unions, collective bargaining
and the resolution of labor disputes.39
The Secretariat, which consists of an Executive Director and a fifteen
person staff, basically serves the informational needs of the Council. 40 In
addition, the Secretariat is charged with periodically preparing back-
ground reports on: labor law and administrative procedures; trends and
administrative strategies related to the implementation and enforcement of
labor law; labor market conditions; and human resource development is-
sues.
41
3. The National Administrative Office
Article 15 of the NAALC requires that each party to the NAFTA
establish a National Administrative Office (NAO) Each NAO serves
33. For a detailed description of the various transitional institutions established under the
NAALC, see Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, The Promotion of International Labor Standards and NAFTA:
Retrospect and Prospects, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427 (1995).
34. NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 8(2).
35. Id.
36. Id. at art. 9(l).
37. Id. at art. 10(l)(a).
38. Id. at art. 10(l)(c).
39. Id. at art. 1 l(l)(a)-(o). Section 11(p) provides for the consideration of other issues upon
agreement by the parties. Id. at art. 1 l(l)(p).
40. Id. at art. 12.
41. Id. at art. 13.
42. Id. at art. 15(1).
[Vol. 10:533
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as a contact point within the given country regarding the NAALC.43
Thus, for example, U.S. companies, unions, and other organizations with
concerns regarding labor law enforcement under the NAALC in other
NAFTA signatory countries would first contact the U.S. NAO." On
April 1, 1994, U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich issued revised
regulations regarding the precise operation of the U.S. NAO.45
III. THE ROLE OF THE U.S. NAO
A. Operation of the U.S. NAO
The U.S. NAO was established effective January 1, 1994 within the
Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) of the U.S. Department of
Labor. The NAO is headed by a secretary who reports to the U.S. Secre-
tary of Labor. Pursuant to Article 21(1) of the NAALC, 46 the U.S. NAO
is empowered to "request consultations with the National Administrative
Office of another party in relation to that party's labor law, its administra-
tion of the law, or labor market conditions in its territory .... The
U.S. NAO also assists the U.S. Secretary of Labor in developing and im-
plementing "cooperative activities" under the NAALC such as conferenc-
es, seminars, joint research, projects, etc.48
Procedurally, relevant "persons" 49 with complaints regarding "labor
law matters arising in the territory of another Party" may file submissions
with the NAO.50 Such submissions must specify to what extent the mat-
ters complained of are inconsistent with that party's obligations under the
NAALC, and to what extent there has been harm to the submitter or other
persons. 5 Persons filing such submissions must also address whether
"the matters complained of appear to demonstrate a pattern of non-en-
forcement of labor law by another Party," and whether relief has been, or
43. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation; Establishment of National Admin-
istration Office, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,410 (1993).
44. See generally Crandall, supra note 13, at 184-89.
45. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation; Revised Notice of Establishment of
U.S. National Administrative Office and Procedural Guideline, 59 Fed. Reg 16,660 (1994).
46. NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 21(1).
47. 59 Fed. Reg. at 16,661.
48. Id.
49. The term "person" under the regulations is defined to include one or more "individuals, non-
governmental organizations, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, or legal
representatives." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
1995]
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is being, sought in another forum.52
Once a submission has been filed, the secretary of the NAO has
sixty days to determine whether or not to accept the submission for for-
mal review. The test used in making this decision is whether the submis-
sion "raises issues relevant to labor law matters in the territory of another
Party and if a review would further the objectives" of the NAALC.53
Conversely, the secretary may deny review if the statements contained in
the given submission would, even if substantiated, "not constitute a fail-
ure of another Party to comply with its obligations" under the
NAALC.54
Once a submission is accepted for review, the secretary is generally
required to promptly schedule a hearing which is open to the public."
The secretary is required to issue a public report including any findings
and recommendations within 120 days of the acceptance of a submission
for review, although an extension of time of up to an additional sixty
days may be permitted under certain circumstances. 6 Normally, it will
take about six months from the time an initial submission is made until a
final report is issued.57
Should the U.S. NAO find in favor of the complainant, it will seek
implementation of its findings through "consultations" with the other
relevant NAO.5 8 If such consultations do not resolve the matter satisfac-
torily, the secretary of the NAO will request the U.S. Secretary of Labor
to seek "consultations at the ministerial level" to resolve the matter.5 9 If
the issues involved in the submission involve "occupational safety and
health or other technical labor standards,"' the NAALC provides for
further review beyond that of ministerial level consultations. 6' The term
"technical labor standards," however, is defined quite narrowly in Article
49 of the NAALC to encompass only issues like the prohibitions on
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 16,661-62.
55. Id. at 16,662.
56. Id.
57. The secretary of the NAO has up to 60 days or two months to decide whether or not to ac-
cept a submission for review and then normally up to 120 days or four months to hold a public hear-
ing and issue a report. The total time elapsed should thus be about six months. Id.
58. See NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 21; see also 59 Fed. Reg. at 16,662.
59. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 16,662.
60. NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 23.
61. Matters falling within this definition can be further reviewed by an evaluation committee of
experts pursuant to Articles 23-28 of the NAALC. Some limited issues may then be subject to even
further review by an arbitral panel. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 16,662.
[Vol. 10:533
HeinOnline  -- 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 540 1994-1995
NAALC: A NEW FRONTIER
forced labor, the protection of child labor, and the enforcement of mini-
mum wage and overtime pay standards.62 Matters such as freedom of
association and the right to engage in collective bargaining are explicitly
not included in this definition.63 Consequently, the NAO's enforcement
authority ends at the ministerial consultations level for issues regarding
union organizing and related topics.'
The NAO, then, provides the initial forum for complaints filed under
the NAALC. Less than two years after its implementation, U.S. unions
have made clear their intent to utilize the structure established under the
Labor Agreement to voice asserted violations of labor rights in Mexico.
In order to analyze union submissions to the U.S. NAO and their resolu-
tion, however, one should first examine the legal background against
which these submissions have been, and will be, evaluated, i.e., the envi-
ronment of Mexican labor law.
IV. MEXIcAN LABOR LAW AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
ENVIRONMENT
A. Labor Relations in Mexico
Similar to other countries in Central and South America, the Mexi-
can labor movement played a critical role in the political transformation
of that country. 65 Labor unions played an important role in the revolu-
tionary movement of the early 1900s intended to overthrow the dictator-
ship of President Porfirio Diaz.66 Organized labor aligned forces with the
Mexican Liberal Party, which was one of the leading groups in the revo-
lutionary movement. In 1906, in an attempt to ignite the revolution
against Diaz, the Mexican Liberal Party, with the help of labor, organized
a series of strikes. Although the strikes were unsuccessful in starting a
62. NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 49.
63. The NAALC in Article 49 specifically leaves out from the definition of "technical labor
standards" matters related to provisions (a) through (c) of the same article's definition of "labor law."
Definitions (a) through (c) are: "(a) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; (b)
the ight to bargain collectively; and (c) the right to strike." Id. at art. 49(a)-(c).
64. Thus, the U.S. NAO in many respects lacks "teeth" and the overall enforcement powers
under NAALC are really quite limited. See Crandall, supra note 13, at 186; Hagen, supra note 8, at
928.
65. See Amira Galin, Myth and Reality: Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in the Transition
to Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF INDusTImAL RELATIONS: GLOBAL CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 295-
306 (John R. Niland et al. eds., 1994).
66. See DAN LA BOTz, MASK OF DEMOCRACY: LABOR SUPPRESSION IN MEXICO TODAY 61-75
(1992) (providing an historical account of the development of labor unions in Mexico).
1995]
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revolution, they illustrated the willingness- of the Mexican labor move-
ment to form alliances with political organizations in order to further
common goals.67
During the next eleven years, and preceding the enactment of the
1917 Constitution, the Mexican labor movement entered into a series of
formal pacts with various political forces.68 In 1915, for example, the
dominant labor organization in the country, the House of the World's
Workers ("La Casa del Obrero Mundial") entered into an agreement with
the constitutional forces of President Carranza, agreeing to fight with
Carranza's Constitutionals Army in exchange for the government's com-
mitment to enact labor laws designed to protect workers' rights.69 This
pact is significant because it demonstrates the willingness of the Mexican
labor movement to "compromise" its stated principles in order to achieve
its political goals. 70 The House of the World's Workers had been, up to
that point, an anarchist labor movement.7 The union had refused to be
involved in politics, and instead it had relied on "direct action" against
employers in the form of general strikes and boycotts.7 As part of the
1915 pact, however, the union redefined itself by accepting the principle
of political participation. This shift is important since it marks the begin-
ning of the long-lasting and current Mexican practice of making support
for the dominant political force a requirement for official government
recognition of the labor movement. 73
The relationship between the labor movement and the state continued
to be forged during the next several years. In the early 1920s, the recently
founded Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederaci6n
Regional de Obreros Mexicanos, or "CROM") lent its support to the
administration of President Alvaro Obregon.74 This support, in the form
of canceling planned strikes, was exchanged for union appointments to
67. Id. at 61-62; see also GLORIA LEFF ZIMERMAN, Los PAcros OBREROS Y LA INSTITuCION
PRESIDENCIAL EN MEXICO: 1915-1938 (1991) (providing an institutional analysis of the various labor
agreements entered between the government and the labor unions during the forming years following
the Mexican revolution).
68. ZIMERMAN, supra note 67, at 75-98; see also LA BoTz, supra note 66, at 61-62.
69. ZIMERMAN, supra note 67, at 75-98; see also LA BoTZ, supra note 66, at 61-62.
70. See ZIMERMAN, supra note 67, at 77-84.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Amy H. Goldin, Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled by the Lack of Democracy in
Trade Unions, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 203, 204-09 (1990) (describing the relationship between the Mexi-
can government and the labor movement).
74. See LA BoTz, supra note 66, at 63.
[Vol. 10:533
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leadership positions in government.75 However, in the 1930s, when the
CROM's support for the government started to fade, the government
encouraged the creation of an alternative confederation called the Mexi-
can Workers Confederation (Confederaci6n de Trabajadores Mexicanos,
or "CTM").
76
The CTM and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional, or "PRI"), which has dominated Mexican
politics since the late 1920s, have since continued this power-based rela-
tionship. The PRI has shifted resources and support between the CTM
and other interest groups, depending on the political needs of the party.
77
At other times, the PRI has encouraged the formation of alternative con-
federations, in order to mitigate what the party perceived to be a shift in
the balance of power in favor of the CTM. 78 For example, the Revolu-
tionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (Confederaci6n
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos, or "CROC") was formed in the
1950s, under the direct orders of Mexican President Ruiz Cortines, to
oppose and reduce the power of the CTM.7 9
The CTM, however, remains the largest and most important among
the Mexican labor confederations.80 Although in theory all the confed-
erations share equal access to the party organization through the Labor
Congress (Congreso del Trabajo, or "CT"), which is the official labor
branch of the PRI, the CTM is clearly in a privileged position vis-a-vis
other trade unions.8 The Labor Congress is dominated by the CTM's
leadership, allowing the CTM direct access to the President of the Repub-
lic and to the Minister of Labor.82 The PRI leadership is intimately min-
gled with the leadership of the CTM and the CT. On a regular basis, the
PRI runs labor officials as candidates for various political offices, at the
federal, state, and local levels.83
Until 1990, the "official" labor confederations required workers who
75. See Goldin, supra note 73, at 206.
76. Id. at 206-07.
77. Id. at 207-09.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally Victor Manuel Durand Ponte, The Confederation of Mexican Workers, the La-
bor Congress and the Crisis of Mexico's Social Pact, in UNIONS, WORKERS AND THE STATE IN MEX-
ico 85-104 (Kevin J. Middlebrook ed., 1991) (describing the predominance of the CTM within the
Labor Congress, and the Mexican labor movement).
81. See Goldin, supra note 73, at 206-09.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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were employed in union shops to join the confederations' local unions,
which in turn were associated with the PRI.84 Failure to agree to join the
party could likely result in expulsion from the union and, consequently,
dismissal from employment. In 1990, the President of the CTM, Fidel
Velazquez, entered into an agreement with the head of the PRI, Senator
Luis Colosio, terminating this practice of "forced mass affiliation. 8 5 Im-
mediately, however, the leaders of the CTM pledged their support to the
PRI, and announced a new campaign to recruit new party members.8 6
In addition to the "official" labor organizations in Mexico which
form part of the CT, there are two other kinds of unions: the white unions
and the independent unions. The white unions are similar to employer-
dominated "company" unions in the United States.87 They are concen-
trated in the state of Nuevo Leon. 8 The mere fact of their existence is
interesting, since they present a challenge to the government and the
government's dominated labor movement.
The independent or democratic unions represent the only viable chal-
lenge to the "official" unions. 89 As independent labor organizations,
these unions operate independently of the CTM and thus, are not con-
trolled by the state. Among the most important of the independent labor
unions is the Authentic Labor Front (Frente Autentico del Trabajo, or
"FAT"). The FAT is the union that has been involved in the four recent
filings before the U.S. NAO. 90
Despite the existence of these alternative unions, the "official" un-
ions are still by far the most important and powerful labor group in Mexi-
co. Understanding Mexican labor relations and labor law requires that one
properly characterize the relationship between the State and the "official"
unions. As one commentator on Mexican labor relations has observed:
84. See LA BoTZ, supra note 66, at 39-41.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 42. "Company" unions are defined in the United States as an organization of em-
ployees formed by and recognized within a particular firm. This type of union does not meet the
requirements of the National Labor Relations Act and thus is not considered a true union. See Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988); see, e.g., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (employer found guilty of an unfair labor practice where the compa-
ny representatives were active in promoting the plan, in urging employees to join, in the preparation
of the details of organization, including bylaws, in presiding over organization meetings, and in se-
lecting the employees representatives of the organization).
88. See LA BOTZ, supra note 66, at 42.
89. Id.
90. See infra notes 120-78 and accompanying text.
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The hierarchical state-party-union system of control means that
the official labor unions have as one of their principal tasks the
defense and promotion of party and government policy, includ-
ing economic policy. At the very least, the government and
party will expect that its affiliated unions will not act as obsta-
cles to the implementation of government policy. Clearly, this
relationship between the state, party, and union limits the free-
dom of action of the labor unions and of the workers who be-
long to them. At worst, it means that the unions are unwilling
and even unable to defend their members against the state, or to
advance the interests of the workers when those interests conflict
with the interests of the state.91
Thus, it is unclear to what extent the CTM always functions as a true
"labor union" concerned primarily with representing its members.
B. The Mexican Labor Law Environment
Mexican workers are covered by what probably is the most compre-
hensive set of labor rights not only in North America, but perhaps even
the world.92 Mexican labor law views its involvement in comprehensive-
ly regulating the employment relationship as necessary for the achieve-
ment of social justice.93 In order to achieve such "social justice," Mexi-
can labor law provides workers with detailed rights in most areas of the
employment relationship.94 Labor rights are found in the Mexican Con-
stitution of 191795 and in the Federal Labor Law of 1970.9
6
Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution serves as the main source of
worker protections in Mexico. Article 123 provides that "every person is
entitled to suitable work that is socially useful. Toward this end, the cre-
ation of jobs and social organization for labor shall be promoted in con-
91. LA BoTz, supra note 66, at 41.
92. See Mark E. Zelek & Oscar de la Vega, An Outline of Mexican Labor Law, 43 LAB. LJ. 466
(1992) (describing the origins of Mexican labor law) [hereinafter Zelek & Vega].
93. See Ann M. Bartow, The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 11 ComP. LAB. L.J. 182, 188-91
(1990).
94. See generally Zelek & Vega, supra note 92.
95. MEX. CONST., reprinted in X CoNsTrnTIoNS OF THE WORLD 97 (A.P. Blaustein & G.H.
Flanz eds., 1988) [hereinafter CONST.J.
96. Federal Labor Law of 1970, reprinted in Ro dney D. Anderson, Mexico, in LATIN AMERICAN
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 514 (Gerald M. Greenfield & Sheldon L. Maram eds., 1987) [hereinafter
FLLI.
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formance with the law., 97 The Mexican Constitution goes on specifically
to protect a myriad of worker rights.98 Article 123 provides workers the
right to organize labor unions, protects the right to strike, and provides
for an implied right to enter into collective bargaining contracts. 99 In
addition, it protects individual worker rights by establishing a minimum
wage, an eight-hour work day, a maximum work week of six days, and
provides for overtime pay and for maternity leave. 1°°
Article 123 also establishes tripartite Boards of Conciliation and
Arbitration (Juntas de Conciliaci6n y Arbitraje, or "CABs").' 0' The
CABs are made up of an equal number of employer and worker represen-
tatives, and one representative from the government. 0 2 The CABs, as
discussed below, were given a broad set of powers for the resolution of
labor disputes and worker rights. 3
The Federal Labor Law of 1970 is intended to implement the provi-
sions of constitutional Article 123.'04 Thus, the Federal Labor Law con-
tains, for example, provisions dealing with when employers can dismiss
employees without liability;'05  how labor disputes are to be
97. CONST., supra note 95, at art. 123.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 123(XX). "Differences or disputes between capital and labor shall be subject to the
decisions of a Conciliation and Arbitration Board, consisting of an equal number of representatives of
workers and employers, with one from the government." Id.
102. Id.; see also id. at arts. 593, 601.
103. See LA BoTz, supra note 66, at 55-58 (discussing the functioning of the CABs). The CABs
exist at both the Federal and the Local levels. Their function is to "hear and resolve labor conflicts
between workers and employees, or among workers only, or employers only, which derive from labor
relations or from events closely associated with such relations." FLL, supra note 96, at art. 612 (A
similar provision is found in Article 623 and applicable to local boards).
104. LA BOTz, supra note 66, at 43-44.
105. Article 47 enumerates specific kinds of conduct whereby a worker can be dismissed without
further responsibility for the employer.
- If the worker, or the union which had proposed or recommended the worker, deceives the
employer with false certificates or references showing that the employee has ability, compe-
tency and faculties that the worker does not possess. This cause for dismissal shall cease to
have effect thirty days after the worker started rendering his services;
- If the worker, during working hours, commits dishonest or violent acts, makes threats,
offends or mistreats the employer, the employer's family or the officers or administrative
personnel of the enterprise or establishment, unless there is provocation or he acts in self-
defense;
- If the worker commits any of the offenses listed in the preceding paragraph against co-
workers and, as a result of such actions, the discipline in the place of employment is altered;
- If the worker, outside of working hours, commits any of the offenses referred to in the
preceding paragraphs against the employer, the employer's family or the officers or adminis-
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resolved;'06 and what registration and notification requirements are nec-
essary in order to establish new labor unions. 7 The federal labor laws
trative personnel, and the offense is of such serious nature that it makes the work relation-
ship impossible;
- If, during the performance of his work or by reason of it, the worker intentionally causes
material damage to the buildings, works, machinery, instruments, raw materials and other
things related to the work;
- If the worker causes serious damage of the kind mentioned in the preceding paragraph, not
willfully but through negligence;
- If the worker, through negligence or inexcusable carelessness, jeopardizes the safety of the
establishment or of the persons in it;
- If the worker commits immoral acts in the establishment or place of employment;
- If the worker reveals manufacturing secrets or confidential matters to the detriment of the
enterprise;
- If the worker is absent more than three times within a thirty-day period, without permis-
sion from the employer or without reasonable cause;
- If the worker disobeys the employer or the employer's representative, without reasonable
cause, in matters related to the work under contract;
- If the worker refuses to adopt preventive measures or to follow the established procedures
indicated to avoid accidents or illnesses;
- If the worker comes to work in a state of drunkenness or under the influence of a narcotic
or depressant drug, unless there is in the latter case a medical prescription. Before starting
work, the worker shall make this fact known to the employer and present the prescription
signed by the doctor;
- A final judgment imposing a prison sentence on the worker, which prevents the worker
from fulfilling the employment contract; and,
- Causes similar to those set forth in the preceding paragraphs, of equal seriousness and of
similar consequences insofar as the work is concerned.
FLL, supra note 96, at art. 47.
106. Hearings before CABs consist of three consecutive stages: conciliation, arguments, and pre-
sentation of evidence. Under Article 876, the parties are required to appear in person, "without attor-
neys, advisers, or proxies." Id. at art. 876. At this stage the Board will promote dialogue between the
parties and encourage them to reach a settlement. If an agreement is reached, the conflict will be
deemed to be terminated. At the "arguments" stage hearing, the President of the CAB continues the
conciliatory efforts. If the conciliatory efforts prove unsuccessful, the parties proceed with the presen-
tation of arguments. Id. at arts. 877-78. At the third stage, evidence is introduced and a final ruling is
made by the CAB. Id. at art. 889.
107. In order to be officially recognized, unions must register with the Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare (Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social, or "STPS") in instances where the Federal
Government has jurisdiction, and with the local CAB in instances where local jurisdiction applies.
Registration requires the presentation of the following documents: (1) a certified copy of the minutes
of the general meeting at which the union was established; (2) a list of the names of the members and
their employers; (3) a certified copy of the by-laws; and (4) a certified copy of the minutes of the
meeting at which the Board of Directors was elected. FLL, supra note 96, at art. 365.
Once the required documents are presented to STPS or a CAB, registration occurs within 60
days unless the registering authority determines that: (1) the purposes of the union do not coincide
with those set out in Article 356 ("the study, advancement and defense of the... [rights of work-
ers]"); (2) the union does not have the minimum number of workers established by Article 364 (20
workers); or (3) the union has not submitted all the documents required by Article 365. Id. at art. 366.
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have been both praised for clarifying and expanding workers' rights and
criticized for placing certain restrictions on those constitutionally-based
rights.'08
For example, the Federal Labor Law gives workers the right to form
unions without any prior registration or notification requirements.'09
However, the law also states that legal recognition will only be given to
those unions which obtain legal registration from the proper authori-
ties." Without legal recognition, unions are unable to exercise their
collective rights."' Thus, the registration requirement has become one
of the most important mechanisms of state control of the labor move-
ment."'2
A similar situation exists with respect to the right to strike. Although
the Mexican Constitution of 1917 provides workers the right to engage in
strikes if the objective of the strike is "establishing equilibrium among di-
verse factors of production, harmonizing the rights of workers with those
of capital",' the 1970 Federal Labor Law established a series of notifi-
cation procedures, involving attempts at conciliation, that must be fol-
lowed prior to striking. 14 The CABs oversee the procedural notifica-
tion/ conciliation requirements." 5 The CABs have served as instruments
of government/party control since their creation." 16 The CABs have
used their power regarding pre-strike notification requirements to severely
limit the right of unions to strike." 7 For example, during the 1980s
CABs stopped granting the right to strike to insurgent worker coalitions,
instead allowing only officially recognized labor unions holding current
collective bargaining agreements to strike."l8 Thus, in practice, only
those labor unions that have submitted to the registration process, and
have dealt with the employer at the bargaining table, are legally able to
engage in strikes." 9
In short, the Mexican labor relations and labor law environments
108. LA BOTZ, supra note 66, at 43.
109. FLL, supra note 96, at art. 357.
110. Id. at art. 365.
111. LA BoIz, supra note 66, at 44-46.
112. Id.
113. CONST., supra note 95, at pt. A., ch. XVIII.
114. FLL, supra note 96, at art. 452(I)-(I1i).
115. CONST., supra note 95, at pt. A., ch. XVIII.
116. LA BoTz, supra note 66, at 55-57.
117. Id. at 49-51.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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present an interesting contradiction. Constitutionally and statutorily, Mexi-
can workers are provided with unparalleled protections due in part to the
very active role that labor organizations have played in Mexican politics
and to their carefully organized structure and position within the Mexican
bureaucracy. However, the willingness shown by the "official" labor
unions in Mexico to compromise worker rights for the sake of politics,
has arguably resulted in the co-optation of Mexican labor unions by the
government and the partial demise of individual worker rights and worker
democracy in that country.
V. CASES BROUGHT BEFORE THE NAO
A. Allegations
1. Honeywell
On February 14, 1994, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(Teamsters) filed the first submission to the NAO, submission number
94001.120 The submission involved a complaint about the labor practices
of Honeywell, Inc. at its Chihuahua, Mexico plant that makes thermostats,
parts for circuit boards, and heating and air purifier switches.12' This
plant employs approximately 480 production workers.
22
In its complaint, the Teamsters alleged that Honeywell paid its Chi-
huahua workers "depressed wages" and that it used "illegal threats and
firings to keep its employees from joining a union.' 2' The union also
alleged that Honeywell had been "steadily" shifting work from its opera-
tions in Minnesota and other states in the United States to its plant in
Chihuahua, thus harming the Teamsters Union in the United States.
24
With regard to Honeywell's labor practices in Mexico, the Teamsters
alleged that in late November 1993, the company fired twenty production
workers that had expressed interest in joining STIMAHCS. 25
STIMAHCS is a Mexican "independent union" affiliated with the Au-
thentic Labor Front/FAT. 126 The Teamsters also alleged that Honeywell
120. See Letter from Earl V. Brown, Jr., Associate General Counsel, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, to Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Acting Secretary, U.S. NAO, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs (Feb.
14, 1994) (on file with the Texas A&M Business School) [hereinafter Honeywell Submission].
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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offered one FAT supporter "financial assistance" if she gave the company
the name of other pro-union employees and that the company told this
woman that it "would close its Mexican plant before it would permit a
union like STIMAHCS.' ' 127 Finally, the union alleged that Honeywell,
in concert with other employers, used "spying, electronic surveillance,
locked-door interrogations, threats, and firings to keep out independent
groups like FAT."'
28
In their submission, the Teamsters asserted that these labor practices
by Honeywell violated Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution.' 29 The
union also alleged that Honeywell had violated the Labor Principles con-
tained in Annex One of the NAALC.1
30
Moreover, while acknowledging that the fired employers had signed
resignation forms waiving their claims against Honeywell,' 31 the union
alleged that the company had pressured these employees to sign such
forms, and that the employees only went along because they wanted to
receive "statutory severance pay.'132 The Teamsters further alleged that
Honeywell, by putting such pressure on employees had violated Article
123 of the Mexican Constitution and the Labor Principles of the
NAALC.
133
Responding to these allegations, the company, in a letter to the sec-
retary of the NAO dated May 24, 1994, stated that twenty three positions
were eliminated at the company's Chihuahua, Mexico plant in November
1993 as "part of a downsizing of the operation."' 34 Of the twenty-three
workers laid off, the company asserted that twenty two of the employees
were good or satisfactory workers and that said employees had "received
full separation benefits, in accordance with Mexican law.' 35 The com-
pany further asserted that one employee was terminated "due to violations
in written workplace rules" and thus did not receive severance pay.)
This employee, however, contested her termination with the Chihuahua
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id.; see CONST., supra note 95, at art. 123.
130. Honeywell Submission, supra note 120, at 5.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id.
134. BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, NAO's PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW ON SUBMISSIONs No. 940001
& NO. 940002, 8 (1994) (on file with the Texas A&M Business School) [hereinafter NAO REPORT].
135. Id.
136. Id. at 4.
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Conciliation and Arbitration Board,'37 and on March 28, 1994, the Arbi-
tration Board approved a settlement between this worker and the com-
pany. 3 8 The company asserted that although it had properly dismissed
this employee, it had entered into the Arbitration Board-approved settle-
ment in order to avoid the costs of pursuing the case "through administra-
tive and legal processes under Mexican law."'
139
2. General Electric
The second submission filed with the NAO was also filed on Febru-
ary 14, 1994 and involved a charge by the United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America Union (UE) against the General Electric
Company.' 4 In this submission, UE President John H. Hovis, Jr. noted
that as one of the very first submissions to the NAO under the NAALC it
represented an "historic document"14' and involved "serious issues"
concerning General Electric's suppression of the "rights of association
and organization of its Mexican employees.' 42 Mr. Hovis also alleged
that General Electric had violated the "minimum standards of employ-
ment" of its Mexican employees, and jeopardized their "health and safe-
ty.' 43
More specifically, UE alleged that General Electric, had "flagrantly
violated the labor and human rights of its employees" at its motor plant in
Juarez, Mexico.' 44 The union alleged that the company unlawfully pre-
vented the distribution of union literature and fired over 100 workers who
had expressed interest in the independent union STIMAHCS. 45 The
union also alleged that the company had failed to pay workers properly
for overtime and had failed to comply with a wide range of health and
safety requirements, including not providing adequate protective equip-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id.
140. See Letter from John H. Hovis, Jr., General President, United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, to Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Acting Secretary, U.S. NAO, Bureau of Int'l Labor Af-
fairs (Feb. 14, 1994) (on file with the Texas A&M Business School) [hereinafter General Electric
Submission].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Submission and Request for Review of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America, to U.S. NAO, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Feb. 14, 1994) (on file with the Texas A&M Business
School) [hereinafter General Electric Submission].
145. Id. at 6, 10-11.
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ment, not providing proper work area ventilation, and not having func-
tioning health and safety committees.'"
The union also alleged that General Electric had improperly pres-
sured discharged workers "into accepting severance pay and relinquishing
claims for reinstatement."' 47 UE asserted that pressuring employees in
this way violated Article 123, Section 22 of the Mexican Constitution, as
well as Articles 47 and 947 of the Federal Labor Law of Mexico and
international standards. 14
In response to these allegations, the General Electric Company ar-
gued that the NAO did not have jurisdiction under the NAALC to initiate
a review of the submission. 149 The company asserted that the complaint
did not deal with a "pattern of non-enforcement by the Government of
Mexico of Mexican labor law," that the union had not attempted to "re-
solve the complaint under Mexican law," and "that the conduct in ques-
tion had predated the effective date of the NAALC."' 50 Without waiv-
ing its jurisdictional arguments, the company did, however, also rebut the
factual representations made by the union.
According to the company, the terminations of workers made in late
1993 were for "various work rule violations."' 5' The company stated,
though, that at the request of the union, it did review some terminations
and that, taking into account "the severity of the work rule violations and
the totality of the circumstances," it decided that six of these terminations
were not warranted. 152 It then offered these employees reinstatement,
and alternatively, additional severance pay if they were not interested in
reinstatement. 53 The company argued that all these employees elected
the additional severance pay option, and that a formal agreement was
signed and filed with the Local Conciliation Board dealing with this mat-
ter. 54 The company noted that other employees that had not received
reinstatement offers had generally signed "settlement agreements" with
the company.'55 In the company's opinion, these events were "not in-
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 11-12.
148. Id.
149. See NAO REPORT, supra note 134, at 8.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 8-9.
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
[Vol. 10:533
HeinOnline  -- 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 552 1994-1995
NAALC: A NEW FRONTIER
dicative of a pattern of non-enforcement of Mexican labor law.' 56 Gen-
eral Electric asserted that Mexican labor law clearly allows employers and
employees to resolve their differences through settlement agreements of
the kind entered into in this case.
157
3. Sony
On August 16, 1994, the third case before the NAO was filed in-
volving allegations by the International Labor Rights Education and Re-
search Fund and other groups against Sony Corporation.' The workers
in Sony's plants in Nuevo Laredo manufactured video cassette tapes,
audio cassette tapes, and computer disks.'5 9 The submission alleged that
Sony's Magneticos de Mexico subsidiary in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico had
engaged in "persistent violations of workers' rights, particularly in the
area of freedom of association."' 6
At the heart of the complaint against Sony is alleged collusion be-
tween the company and Mexico's official labor confederation, the
CTM.161 Of the approximately 2,000 workers employed by Sony in
Nuevo Laredo, about 1,800 are represented by the CTM. 162 Some of
these workers, however, apparently became disenchanted with the CTM
and decided to form an alternate union representation delegate state. 63
The labor groups involved in the instant submission charged that Sony
actively attempted to destroy this democratic labor movement by firing,
demoting, and harassing workers who tried to organize an independent
union and who criticized the collaboration between Sony management and
CTM leaders.' 64
The submission cites, in particular, an election for union delegates
held in April, 1994 where the CTM, with apparent company assistance,
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Submission of International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, Asociacion
Nacional de Abogados Democraticos, Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras and American Friends
Service Committee, to U.S. NAO, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Aug. 16, 1994) (on file with the Texas A&M
Business School) [hereinafter Sony Submission].
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id. at 1.
161. Id.
162. See NAFTA: Sony, Mexican Government Charged Under NAFTA Accord, 8 Lab. Rel. Week
(BNA) 805 (Aug. 17, 1994).
163. See Sony Submission, supra note 158, at 11.
164. See id. at 6-12; see also NAFTA: Sony, Mexican Government Charged Under NAFTA Ac-
cord, supra note 162.
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effectively blocked secret ballot voting by insisting on open votes in-
stead. 165  The submission also directly points to the Mexican
government's July 15, 1994 decision to deny a registration petition by a
new independent union seeking to represent Sony employees." 6 Finally,
the submission also alleged that Sony had committed fair labor standards
violations of Mexican law by forcing employees to work on weekends
and denying them certain national holidays. 67
The company responded to these allegations by stating that it has
never violated any Mexican law or fired any worker for union activi-
ty' 168 The company characterized the matters involved as chiefly "inter-
nal union" issues which do "not involve Sony."'169 Sony asserted that
the April 1994 worker protests grew out of frustration over events "within
the union, not over Sony policy."'o7 Finally, the company stated that it
was common and legal in Mexico for employees to work on weekends,
and asked the NAO to disregard the entire complaint because Sony did
not break any laws. 7'
4. Second General Electric Case
On September 14, 1994, UE filed a follow-up charge against General
Electric, representing the fourth submission to date made to the NAO. 72
In this submission, UE alleged further and continuing labor and human
rights violations by General Electric at its Juarez, Mexico motor
plant.' Supplementing its February 14, 1994 submission, 74  the
union charged that General Electric committed various illegal practices
prior to an August 24, 1994 secret ballot labor election at the Juarez
plant. 7  UE also charged that the state government of Chihuahua ille-
165. See Sony Submission, supra note 158, at 7-10.
166. See id. at 11-12. More specifically, the petition was denied by the Local Arbitration and
Conciliation Commission. Id.
167. See id. at 5-6.
168. See NAFTA: Sony, Mexican Government Charged Under NAFTA Accord, supra note 162
(referring to statement of Sony spokesmen, Rick Clancy).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Supplemental Submission and Request for Review of United Electrical, Radio and Ma-
chine Workers of America, to U.S. NAO, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with the
Texas A&M Business School) [hereinafter Second GE Submission].
173. See id. at 1.
174. See supra notes 140-157 and accompanying text.
175. See Second GE Submission, supra note 172, at 1-2. The union charged that the company,
among other things, threatened workers, telling them that the plant would close if a union came in,
[Vol. 10:533
HeinOnline  -- 10 Conn. J. Int'l L. 554 1994-1995
NAALC: A NEW FRONTIER
gaily refused to process STIMAHC's/FAT's demand for direct union
recognition and an initial signed company/union contract.'76 Very
interestingly, however, and as will be discussed below, 177 on January
19, 1995, UE formally withdrew this NAO submission. 78
B. Decisions
1. Honeywell and General Electric
On October 13, 1994, the NAO, in a joint decision, issued its deter-
minations in the Honeywell and first General Electric cases. 179 The
NAO essentially rejected the allegations brought by the Teamsters and the
Electric Workers Union in the respective cases, and refused to recom-
mend that the cases be taken to the level of "ministerial consulta-
tions. ' ' O This recommendation by the NAO was accepted by U.S. Sec-
retary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, who did not request ministerial consul-
tations under Article 22 of the NAALC of these cases.' 8 '
In making its findings in the cases, the NAO emphasized the limited
scope of its jurisdiction. 82 The NAO noted that it is not an "appellate
body" nor is it a "substitute for pursuing domestic remedies.' ' 8 3 More-
over, and perhaps more significantly, the NAO noted that its role was not
"primarily" one of determining whether the two companies involved acted
in violation of Mexican labor law, but rather one of determining whether
the Mexican government was effectively enforcing its labor laws.' 84
Since the NAO was ultimately not able to find that the Mexican govern-
prevented certain employees from participating in the election, and held numerous anti-union captive
audience speeches. Id. at 5.
176. See Letter from Amy R. Newell, General Secretary-Treasurer, United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, to Irasema T. Garza, Director, U.S. NAO, Bureau of Int'l Affairs
(Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with the Texas A&M Business School); see also Second GE Submission,
supra note 172, at 1. This refusal by the state government necessitated the Juarez Labor Board's
scheduling of the election.
177. See infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
178. See Letter from John H. Hovis, Jr., President, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America, to Irasema T. Garza, Secretary, U.S. NAO, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs (Jan. 19, 1995)
(on file with the Texas A&M Business School) (discussing the Withdrawal of NAO Submission No.
940004) [hereinafter UE Withdrawal].
179. See NAO REPORT, supra note 134.
180. Id. at 17-19.
181. Id. at 19.
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 17-19.
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ment had failed to promote compliance or effectively enforce its labor
laws the union submissions were rejected. 8
At the heart of the NAO's decision was its examination of the role
of severance pay in Mexican labor law. 86 The NAO noted that a very
high percentage of Mexican workers that are dismissed from their jobs
elect to take a severance pay package rather than seek reinstatement or
other legal remedies before the appropriate Conciliation and Arbitration
Board.'87 Unlike the United States,'88 Mexico does not have a compre-
hensive unemployment insurance system. 89 The NAO also acknowl-
edged that this system may de facto limit employees' ability to orga-
nize. 9
0
Nevertheless, the NAO rejected the notion that dismissed Mexican
workers were not aware of their options under the law.' 9' The NAO
noted that workers both generally and in the instant cases, appeared clear-
ly aware of their options, and that they made voluntary decisions to ac-
cept cash settlements rather than pursue administrative remedies. 92
In the instant cases, at least, the decision of virtually all the involved
workers to accept cash settlements meant that the issue of whether given
dismissals were "for cause" or "in retribution for union organizing" never
even reached the relevant authorities. 93 In essence, the NAO noted that
the cash settlements preempted any Mexican government consideration of
the issues. 9' Moreover, because of this preemption, the NAO stated
that it was "not in a position to make a finding that the Government of
Mexico failed to enforce the relevant labor laws" regarding freedom of
association.' 95 Because of its inability to find a failure of labor law en-
forcement by the Mexican government, the NAO rejected the unions'
claims. 196
Following the NAO's determination, the Teamsters Union and UE
185. Id.
186. Id. at 18.
187. Id.
188. See generally JAMES LEDVINKA & VIDA G. SCARPELLO, FEDERAL REGULATION OF PERSON-
NEL AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 240-47 (1991).
189. See generally Zelek & Vega, supra note 92.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 17-19.
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issued a joint statement blasting the NAO's decision.'97 Teamsters Pres-
ident Ron Carey attacked the Clinton Administration stating that the
NAO's decision illustrated the lack of commitment by the Administration
with respect to protecting Mexican and U.S. workers' rights. 98 Mr.
Carey also stated that the labor side agreement process under the NAFTA
showed that free trade was a false promise. 199 Ms. Amy Newell,
Secretary-Treasurer of UE echoed similar themes, albeit perhaps even
more forcefully. Ms. Newell called the labor side agreement "toothless
and ineffective," 20° and decried the fact that companies like Honeywell
and General Electric are free to "trample workers' rights while protected
by lack of action on the part of the U.S. Government. "201
Ms. Irasema Garza, the Secretary of NAO, responded to these charg-
es and defended the agency's actions in these cases.202 Ms. Garza stated
that the decision of the NAO not to go forward in these cases does not
mean that the NAALC has no teeth.2 °3 She also noted that the overall
process has been productive especially in terms of gaining a better under-
standing of Mexican labor law.2 °4
2. Sony
In what has been characterized as a decision that "has resurrected the
U.S. NAO from irrelevance," 20 5 the U.S. NAO on April 11, 1995 held
that Mexican authorities had failed to adequately enforce their labor laws,
and asked that ministerial consultations be held on the matters raised in
the Sony submission.2°6 In its Sony decision, the U.S. NAO addressed
four issues: the dismissal of several Sony employees who were engaged
in union organizing activities, the irregularities occurring during the union
election, the events surrounding the work stoppage that followed the
election, and the denial by Mexican labor authorities of several Sony
197. See Lab. Rel. Week (BNA) 1009 (Oct. 19, 1994).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. NAFTA: Groups Satisfied With the U.S. NAO Report: Garza Says Findings Show NAFTA
Working, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at d16 (Apr. 13, 1995).
206. See BUREAU NAT'L AFFAIRS, NAO's PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW ON SUBMISSION No.
940003 (1995) (on file with the Texas A&M Business School) [hereafter Sony Report].
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employee petitions to register an independent union.2 7 With respect to
the dismissal issue, the report concluded that "it appears plausible that the
workers' discharges occurred for the causes alleged, namely for participa-
tion in union organizing activities."2 8 The report recognized that des-
pite the constitutional and statutory protections afforded to workers under
Mexican law, "the economic realities facing these Mexican workers make
it very difficult to seek redress from the proper Mexican authorities for
violations of Mexican labor law.''2°9
Concerning the union election issue, the report points out that under
Mexican law, the conduct of internal union affairs is largely left to the
unions themselves.210 The apparent unavailability of any outside re-
course with respect to improper union activity, concludes the U.S. NAO,
"raises questions regarding availability of private action and procedural
guarantees addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the NAALC. 21'
Concerning the next issue, the events surrounding the work stoppage
that followed the failed election, the report recognized that the stoppage
was not an authorized strike, and thus illegal under Mexican law.21 2
However, the report also stated that allegations of police violence and
other incidents during the strike raised important questions concerning the
enforcement of Mexican labor law.21 3
Finally, with respect to the union registration issue, the report blasted
Mexican labor authorities for using "technicalities" to thwart the organiz-
ing efforts of independent labor unions.214 The U.S. NAO found that the
reason advanced by the Mexican CAB for denying the union petition, the
failure to submit a duplicate of the petition and other technical deficien-
cies in the supporting documentation, were not convincing.21 5 The
report went on to describe how the Mexican registration requirements and
their enforcement by the appropriate authorities were used to stop inde-
pendent union organizing activities. The report stated:
It is not insignificant that the time consumed by the denials on
these grounds has arguably caused the interested workers an
207. Id. at 2-6.
208. Id. at 27.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 28.
211. Id. at29.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 30-32.
215. Id.
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irreparable harm in that several workers who signed the original
petition (including the leaders of the movement to register a new
union), were subsequently separated from their employment. As
a result, even if the workers avail themselves of the opportunity
to re-submit the petition in proper form, it could become even
more challenging to locate the requisite number of eligible
workers to sign a new petition for registration .... Moreover,
that the registration process appears to have been thwarted by
technicalities serves as an additional disincentive.216
As a remedial measure, the report requests Mexican authorities to
participate in ministerial consultations with the United States and Canada
on the issue of union registration,217 as well as cooperative programs on
the issue of union elections.2 8 The report also provides, for a U.S. NAO
independent study on the handling of unjustified dismissal claims in Mex-
iCo.
219
As expected, labor groups in Mexico and the United States voiced
their approval with the U.S. NAO decision. Jerome Levinson, legal coun-
sel to the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, de-
scribed the U.S. NAO's report as "a significant improvement over the
decisions made in the first two NAO cases on violations by GE and
Honeywell of their Mexican workers' rights.
220
3. Second General Electric Case
As noted above,22' on January 19, 1995, the UE withdrew its sec-
ond NAO submission regarding the General Electric Company.222 The
union emphasized that its withdrawal had "no relationship to the merits"
of the submission, but was instead undertaken because the union felt that
the U.S. NAO was not prepared "to provide a full and fair consideration"
of the charge.223 The union asserted that it had concluded that the U.S.
NAO was "unwilling" to truly consider its submission on its merits, and
that the NAO had not "demonstrated a real concern for workers' rights or
216. Id.
217. Id. at 32.
218. Id. at 29.
219. Id. at 28.
220. See Sony Report, supra note 206.
221. See supra notes 172-178 and accompanying text.
222. See UE Withdrawal, supra note 178.
223. Id. at 1.
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a willingness to engage the Mexican government in meaningful discus-
sions regarding such rights. 224
In many respects, the UE's January 19, 1995 withdrawal of its sec-
ond NAO submission represented a part of its response to the NAO's
ruling against the union in the NAO's October 13, 1994 decision in the
Honeywell/General Electric case.' The union, in its January 19, 1995
letter of withdrawal, blasted the NAO's decision in this case, stating that
the NAO had "reviewed the testimony in an extremely cursory fashion
and had generally ignored the evidence presented., 226 The union specifi-
cally chastised the NAO for giving the same weight to statements by
company lawyers and sworn affidavits as it gave to "live testimony by
union witnesses," and for failing to determine whether Mexico had not
enforced its relevant labor laws because the vast majority of workers had
accepted severance/indemnification pay. 227 The union asserted that the
NAO should have dug deeper into the severance pay issue, pointing out
that the fact that a worker chooses to take severance pay "does not lessen
the damage or remedy the violations of the associational and organiza-
tional rights which were committed by the company. "228 UE also sug-
gested that the Mexican Severance Pay System, by forcing workers be-
cause of economic necessity to relinquish rights, violated International
Labor Organization conventions. 229
The union also criticized the U.S. NAO on various procedural
grounds arguing that case hearings had to be held closer to work locations
so as to be more easily accessible to workers, and that NAO employees
did not adequately follow up on submissions or properly respond to union
inquiries about submissions.230 In sum, the union asserted that it expect-
ed no less of a "white wash" with this second submission than had oc-
curred with its first General Electric submission, and thus did not want to
further legitimize the U.S. NAO's process by further participation in this
process.23' The union thus vowed to "have no further dealings with the
NAO until such time as we have reason to believe that your office is
seriously prepared to effectuate its mandate of protecting workers'
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
226. See UE Withdrawal, supra note 178, at 2.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2, 4.
231. Id. at 4.
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rights."232
VI. ANALYSIS OF OPERATION OF NAO AND NAALC
A. Overview
It is important to realize, from the outset, that the NAALC is in
many respects a quite limited document. The Agreement itself is a sort of
administrative agreement, with no real force of law. 233 NAALC is not a
piece of legislation enacted by Congress, nor was it ever even ratified by
Congress. 234 Essentially, it is merely a "memorandum of understanding"
between the respective governments235 regarding the issue of labor
rights under the NAFTA.236 As noted above, 7 the Agreement was en-
tered into in an attempt to mollify concerns in some political sectors in
the United States and Canada regarding general labor standards in Mexi-
co.
238
The fact that the NAALC is not the strongest of legal documents
does not mean, however, that it is meaningless. Thus, Mr. Jack Otero,
current U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of the Bureau of International Labor
Affairs, while recently admitting that the NAALC "could have been a lot
better," also noted that it is an "historic" document.239 Mr. Otero felt
that NAALC warranted this status because it represented a clear commit-
ment by the signatory countries to "ensure that their own labor laws
would be respected and enforced" and because such commitments are not
generally common in trade negotiations.24 As Professor Lance Compa
points out,24' the NAALC represents a significant departure from the
traditional U.S. approach of relying on "aggressive unilateralism" in trade
labor matters. 242 The NAALC, points out Professor Compa, is more
232. Id.
233. Telephone Interview with Pharis J. Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor Rights
Education and Research Fund (Jan. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Harvey Interview].
234. Id.
235. At the present time, NAALC is apparently not yet binding in Canada. Under Canadian law,
the agreement has to be ratified by the provincial governments with the largest workforces, and this
has not yet completely occurred. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
238. See Crandall, supra note 13, at 181 & n.145.
239. See Interview with Jack Otero, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of the International Labor Af-
fairs Bureau, 8 Lab. Rel. Week (BNA) 895 (Sept. 14, 1994).
240. Id.
241. Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric Labor Rights Policy
Under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1995).
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consonant with multilateral principles similar to those relied on by the
European Union, including the reliance on transnational instruments like
the NAO's.
243
In addition to its historic significance as a trade-related document,
and more central to our discussion herein, the NAALC provides the labor
movement in all three countries with institutional mechanisms to "chastise
their own governments for failing to do something about the erosion of
labour rights and standards in their trading partners."2" Thus, the
NAALC provides opportunities for raising public concerns on labor-relat-
ed matters and might serve as a stepping stone for developing new alter-
natives to deal with trade/labor matters more effectively.245
B. Freedom of Association
At the heart of essentially all the cases brought to date under the
NAALC to the U.S. NAO is the issue of freedom of association, and with
respect to this issue the NAALC clearly has limited "teeth." While the
Agreement provides for expert panel and arbitral panel determinations
with respect to alleged violations regarding some issues,246 no such re-
view is permitted with respect to alleged freedom of association viola-
tions. The highest level of review in freedom of association cases is "min-
isterial consultations," and in the Honeywell and first General Electric
cases the U.S. NAO, with the concurrence of the U.S. Secretary of Labor,
refused to take the issue to even this level of review.247
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor has asserted that industrial
relations matters of this kind were omitted from higher levels of review
under the NAALC in an effort to avoid excessive government interference
in labor/management negotiations.2 Critics, of course, see this view as
something of a cop-out, with the Agreement simply removing from scruti-
ny "the abusive practices inherent in the Mexican labor relations sys-
tem.
,249
Regardless of the lens through which one views the NAALC's ap-
242. Id. at 350.
243. Id.
244. Ian Robinson, The NAFTA Labour Accord in Canada: Experience, Prospects and Alterna-
tives, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 475, 489 (1995).
245. Id. at 490-91.
246. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
248. See Crandall, supra, note 13, at 186-87.
249. Id. at 187.
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proach to freedom of association and other industrial relations issues, the
highest level of review regarding such issues is ministerial consultations.
Whether nonbinding consultations at this level will ever result in major
policy changes in the industrial relations area is an open question.250 It
seems obvious, though, that consultations at this level could, under the
right circumstances, result in changes of considerable significance.25'
C. Mexican Severance Pay Issue
Under the Mexican Federal Labor Law, dismissed workers who held
permanent jobs,252 have the right to mandatory reinstatement.253 The
worker can elect, however, "to receive an indemnification equal to three
months' salary. ' 2 4 The right to reinstatement is limited, however. Un-
der Article 49, the employer is not obligated to reinstate an employee in
the following cases: when the worker has been employed for less than
one year; when the employer shows before the CAB that because of the
work performed or the characteristics of the job, the worker will be in
direct and permanent contact with the employer, and the CAB finds that a
normal relationship is not possible; when the worker is a confidential em-
ployee; and when the worker performs domestic or occasional work.55
The issue of severance payment has figured prominently in at least
two of the four complaints submitted to the U.S. NAO. In both the
Honeywell and the General Electric cases, the dismissed employees ar-
gued that they were pressured by their respective employers to accept the
statutory severance pay and relinquish any claim for reinstatement. 56
The companies involved in these two submissions also raised the
statutory severance payment issue in arguing that in their dealings with
250. See id.
251. For example, consultations and negotiations at this general level recently led to the United
States' Mexican "bailout" plan. See generally Mexican Rescue: Bitter Legacy of Battle to Bail Out
Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at 4.
252. See FLL, supra note 96, at art. 48.
253. Id.
254. Id. The statutorily guaranteed "three months' salary" includes any premiums, bonuses, com-
missions and any fringe benefits. In addition, the dismissed employee is entitled to be paid "the sala-
ries accrued from dismissal to the effective date of the award." Id.
255. See FLL, supra note 96, at art. 49. When reinstatement is not possible due to one of the
conditions established under Article 49, the worker is entitled to a lump-sum indemnification equal to
three months salary plus twenty days' salary for each year of seniority. Id. at art. 50; see also Zelek
& Vega, supra note 92, at 467.
256. See Honeywell Submission, supra note 120, at 3; General Electric Submission, supra note
140, at 3.
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their employees they have at all times complied with the appropriate
Mexican labor laws. Honeywell argued that the aggrieved employees had
been laid-off for economic reasons, but that they have received full sepa-
ration benefits, in accordance with Mexican labor law. 7 Similarly,
General Electric argued that, at the request of the union, the company
decided to review the terminations of the dismissed employees. In so
doing, the company found that all but six of the terminations were war-
ranted under the appropriate Mexican labor law. The other six employees
were offered either reinstatement or severance pay. Given such a choice,
the workers elected the severance pay option."
In its joint October 13, 1994 Honeywell/General Electric decision,
the NAO recognized that there were factual disputes as to whether the
given employees had been separated from employment for cause, and as
to whether the employees have been coerced by the employers, or "com-
pelled by personal economic hardship" to accept the severance payment,
rather than apply for reinstatement. 259 The NAO, as noted above,2 °
showed concern regarding the high percentage of dismissed workers that
elect to take severance pay instead of applying for reinstatement. In its
final decision, however, the NAO concluded that the dismissed employees
were aware of their legal rights, and that it was thus proper to honor their
choice. According to the U.S. NAO, acceptance of the severance pay
option resulted in a closing of the cases, preventing Mexican authorities
from making any determinations regarding whether the dismissals were
for cause, and ultimately preventing the U.S. NAO from making any
findings regarding the failure of the Mexican government to enforce its
labor laws.
There are several problems with the rationale advanced in the NAO's
Honeywell/General Electric decision. First, the fact that an individual
worker decides to take severance pay, rather than pursue her claim for
reinstatement, really has no direct bearing on the issue of whether given
companies denied their workers the right of free association guaranteed
under the Mexican Constitution, 261 under Mexican Federal Labor
Law, 262 and under international conventions. 263 Under the NAO's ra-
257. See NAO REPORT, supra note 134, at 10.
258. Id. at 11-12.
259. Id. at 29.
260. See supra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
261. See CONST., supra note 95, at art. 123.
262. See FLL, supra note 96, at art. 357.
263. International Labor Organisation Convention No. 87, July 4, 1950, in I INTERNATIONAL
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tionale, the right of free association guaranteed to all workers under Mex-
ican law is transformed "into a personnel matter, one of wrongful dis-
missal of an individual employee, in which the alternatives are reinstate-
ment or acceptance of severance pay. 2 64 The fact that a dismissed em-
ployee chooses to accept severance pay should not remedy violations of
the right of free association. 26' As recognized by the U.S. NAO in its
recent Sony decision, 266 the current "catch-22" situation that workers
are placed under is untenable and needs to be reformed. If nothing else,
the U.S. NAO should use its moral authority to advance reform of this is-
sue in Mexico.
D. Mexican Independent Unions Issue
A second important issue, raised in all four above-referenced submis-
sions to the U.S. NAO, is the issue of the role that independent unions
play in Mexican industrial relations. A major concern regarding the labor
relations process in Mexico has been the unusually close relationship
between the government and the official labor unions. It has been ar
gued that truly democratic representation of individual employee rights is
impossible since the official unions might be unwilling to advance the
interests of workers when doing so jeopardizes the interests of the
state. 268 The establishment and development of independent unions,
thus, is a necessary condition for the attainment of true industrial democ-
racy in Mexico. Independent unions, however, have been subject to ha-
rassment and persecution, making their existence rather limited.
Although all four cases raised concerns regarding the lack of an
independent labor movement in Mexico, the issue is particularly relevant
in the Sony case. A major aspect of the Sony case involves the attempt
by several Sony employees to form and register a new union.269 The pe-
tition for registration was denied by the local CAB on three grounds.
First, the independent union had failed to include in its bylaws the precise
language required under the Federal Labor Law.270 Second, the local
LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1919-1991, 435 (1992).
264. See Letter from Pharis J. Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor Rights Education
Center and Research Fund, to Irasema T. Garza, Director, U.S. NAO, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs 5
(Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with the Texas A&M Business School) [hereinafter Harvey Letter].
265. Id.
266. See Sony Report, supra note 206.
267. See supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
269. See Sony Submission, supra note 158, at 11-12.
270. Id. The submissions states: The proposed bylaws stated that the union "is constituted as a
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CAB argued that Sony could not register an independent union because,
as part of the Maquiladora Section of the Workers Federation of Nuevo
Laredo (Federacion de Trabajadores de Nuevo Laredo or FTLN),27'
Sony was already covered under the FTLN's collective bargaining agree-
ment.272 Finally, the petition for registration was denied on the argu-
ment that other documentation submitted by the independent union was
technically deficient.2
7 3
The rationale of the CAB in denying recognition to the newly orga-
nized union is flawed in several respects. First, concerning the technical
deficiencies in the application materials, the proper governmental response
under Mexican administrative law should not have been to deny the appli-
cation, but to request correction by the applicant.2 74 With respect to the
argument that Sony was already covered under a collective bargaining
agreement, the Sony submission raises an interesting point of interpreta-
tion. The submitters argue that the fact that there is an existing union and
a collective bargaining agreement is not a bar to the legal registration of
another labor organization.275 Mexican labor law, argue the submitters,
allows for the official co-existence of more than one union at a
workplace, although only the union representing the largest number of
employees controls the administration of the contract.276 Thus, it ap-
pears to have been incorrect for the local CAB to deny official recogni-
tion to the new independent union. The major effect of the denial, for
purposes of the complaint to the U.S. NAO under the NAALC, is that
without official recognition, the independent union is not permitted to
legally challenge the actions of Sony, and thus unable to show that a pat-
tern of non-enforcement by Mexican authorities has occurred. The inabili-
ty to raise the complaint domestically, thus essentially precludes the U.S.
NAO from ever considering the case.
Of perhaps greater concern though is not that the local CAB denied
coalition to defend our rights as workers. According to the ACC (i.e., the local CAB), the union
should have stated that it is "an association of workers constituted for the study, improvement, and
defense of their interests." Id. at n.12.
271. The FTLN is the confederation of the CTM (the official labor unions) in the Nuevo Laredo
area. Id. at 6.
272. Id. at 12.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 17. "It is generally accepted under Mexican law that in an administrative procedure,
the government's legal duty is to assist the applicant, not to treat the application as an adversarial
document." Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 19-20.
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recognition in this particular case, but that the action of the local CAB
appears to fit into a larger pattern of collusion between governmental
authorities and the official unions.277 Thus, if pursuant to the NAALC
the rights of freedom of association and representation are to be promoted
to the "maximum extent possible,"'27 8 the U.S. NAO will have to direct-
ly address the problems confronting independent labor unions in Mexico.
E. An Unanswered Question About the NAO
In its findings and recommendations concerning the Honeywell and
General Electric cases, the U.S. NAO stated:
the NAO review has focused specifically on the Government of
Mexico's promotion of compliance with, and effective en-
forcement of, labor laws that guarantee the right of association
and the right to organize freely and prohibit the dismissal of
workers because of efforts to exercise those rights. As such, the
NAO review has not been aimed primarily at determining
whether or not the two companies named in the submission may
have acted in violation of Mexican labor law. Moreover, the
NAO is not an appellate body, nor is it a substitute for pursuing
domestic remedies. Rather, the purpose of the NAO review
process, including the public hearing, is to gather as much infor-
mation as possible to allow the NAO to better understand and
publicly report on the Government of Mexico's promotion of
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, its labor law
through appropriate government action, as set out in Article 3 of
the NAALC.279
An important question raised in this statement of findings and conclu-
sions, which is crucial to the future viability of the NAALC, is whether
the U.S. NAO should make independent determinations as to whether a
violation raised in submissions indeed occurred, or whether it should
defer to local authorities in making such determinations. As evidenced by
the four cases discussed above, the answer to this question is crucial in
277. See LA BOTZ, supra note 66, at 53-56. La Botz quoted from an interview conducted with a
labor lawyer in Mexico City, who represented workers at Ford Motor Company: "As I see it, the
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration is kind of a freezer where labor rights arrive and are frozen.
The process is drawn out and rights cannot be exercised." Id. at 56.
278. See NAALC, supra note 4, at pmbl.
279. See NAO REPORT, supra note 134, at 17.
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determining whether the NAO, and the NAALC, will have any significant
impact in the enforcement of labor rights in North America.
Given "the reality of the Mexican labor relations system,"2 s a re-
fusal by the US. NAO to make an independent review of whether there
has been a violation of Mexican laws, will frequently mean that those
laws will remain unenforced. In fact, if the determination of whether
Mexico is effectively enforcing its labor laws is left to the Mexican au-
thorities, by definition, the NAO will have difficulty finding that a viola-
tion has ever occurred.
On the other hand, under the NAALC, the U.S. NAO is not empow-
ered "to undertake labor law enforcement activities in the territory of
another party. ''2st The NAALC appears to envision a system under
which the NAO will defer to domestic authorities and only intervene in
disputes in order to determine whether there have been patterns of non-
enforcement by domestic authorities. Thus, the NAALC appears to con-
template that the U.S. NAO should serve as, at most, a sort of weak
appellate body.282 While not an appellate body with power to overturn
the findings of a domestic tribunal, the U.S. NAO appears to be forced
under the Labor Agreement to wait for local enforcement of labor viola-
tions, before making its own determinations of "non-enforcement."
Although not entirely clear, it appears that to date, the U.S. NAO has
opted for neither an independent investigating role nor a weak appellate
role, but instead for a sort of "oversight" role. An analysis of the Admin-
istrative Office's April 11, 1995 Sony decision indicates a clear willing-
ness on the part of the U.S. NAO to prod Mexican authorities concerning
their handling of labor issues by asking for clarifications, 3 pointing out
280. See Harvey Letter, supra note 264, at 3.
281. See NAALC, supra note 4, at art. 42.
282. This apparent contradiction has not gone unnoticed. In his letter to the NAO, Pharis Harvey
states:
The NAO contradicts itself. It states: "The NAO is not an appellate body .... " Again,
however, it claims that it cannot form an independent judgment as to whether (a) the
companies engaged in repressive labor practices in violation of Mexican law and (b) the
government of Mexico failed to enforce its own labor laws, until the Mexican govern-
ment authorities make an initial finding as to whether there has been a violation by the
companies. In imposing such a requirement, what else is the NAO doing but placing
itself in the position of an appellate body?
Harvey Letter, supra note 264, at 2-3.
283. For example, in the Sony Report concerning the work stoppage issue, the U.S. NAO states:
"To assist the U.S. NAO to better understand this incident, the U.S. NAO requests that the Mexican
NAO provide any available information on the police involvement in the work stoppage at MDM."
Sony Report, supra note 206, at 29-30.
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inconsistencies in the record,28 4 and raising questions left unanswered
by Mexican authorities. 2 5 This oversight role does appear to fit the gener-
al framework provided under the NAALC. Whether such a role will prove
sufficient in achieving the objectives of the labor agreement remains a
question for the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation is a docu-
ment of tremendous significance. Implementing the NAALC, however,
has been, and will continue to be, a difficult task. The Agreement, when
it was formulated, was designed to be extremely sensitive to the sovereign
rights of each of the signatory nations in regulating traditional industrial
relations. Indeed, the highest level of "enforcement" for purported viola-
tions in the freedom of association area is simply that of "ministerial
consultations." Moreover, the U.S. NAO has to date been somewhat re-
luctant to recommend that cases proceed even to this level. Further, it
appears that to date, the NAALC has had little impact on addressing one
of the major concerns leading to the agreement's enactment, the loose
enforcement of labor laws in Mexico. Absent unlikely, although possible,
changes to the terms of the NAALC itself, the challenge before the U.S.
NAO is clearly one of how to best seek greater sensitivity to worker
rights in Mexico within the current legal framework.
284. Concerning the dismissal issue, the U.S. NAO states:
Considering the duration of employment of the dismissed workers with MDM (ranging
from four to fifteen year), their documented association with the opposition union move-
ment, and the circumstances of their separation, it appears plausible that the workers'
discharges occurred for the causes alleged, namely for participation in union organizing
activities.
Id. at 27.
285. Concerning the union registration issue, the U.S. NAO states: "Given that serious questions
are raised herein concerning the workers' ability to obtain recognition of an independent union
through the registration process with the local CAB .... I d. at 32.
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